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In a laboratory task similar to an X-ray baggage search at an airport, Wolfe, Horowitz, and Kenner (2005)
reported a ‘‘prevalence effect” (i.e., a very high miss rate) when the presence of a target is very infrequent.
The present study tested whether this prevalence effect is the result of a voluntary top-down control for
future prospect or an implicit bottom-up priming from past experience. Experiments 1 and 2 showed
that, regardless of instructions given on the likelihood of target presence, the magnitude of prevalence
(i.e., the miss rate) was determined only by the actual prevalence of the target. In Experiments 3 and
4, target prevalence was indicated by background color on a trial-by-trial basis. Some blocks (i.e., con-
stant blocks) were either comprised of all high-prevalence trials or all low-prevalence trials, whereas
in other blocks (i.e., mixed blocks) high-prevalence and low-prevalence trials were randomly mixed. Tar-
get prevalence signiﬁcantly affected the miss rate in the constant blocks, but had no effect in the mixed
blocks. Overall, the prevalence effect is essentially the result of past experience and is not affected by
future prospect.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In daily life, human observers constantly perform visual
searches: for instance, we may search for a friend in a crowded
shopping mall or look for our favorite brand of chocolate bar on
the shelves in a supermarket. Sometimes, visual searches have sub-
stantial social importance; failing to ﬁnd desired targets could be
disastrous. Nevertheless, such failures seem to be rather unavoid-
able when the targets appear very rarely (i.e., a ‘‘prevalence
effect”). The prevalence effect has been studied since Kundel
(1982) (see also Gur et al., 2003) and has recently been popularized
by Wolfe Horowitz, and Kenner (2005). This popularization has
triggered a considerable amount of research interest in the ﬁeld
(e.g., Fleck & Mitroff, 2007; Navalpakkam, Koch, & Perona, 2009).
2. The prevalence effect
Wolfe and colleagues’ (2005) experimental design was analo-
gous to X-ray baggage searches for dangerous items at airports.
They found that the prevalence effect reported by radiologists
could be generalized into some real-life situations; when the per-
centage of target-present trials is very low in one condition (e.g.,
one target out of 100 trials), the miss rate becomes remarkably
high (see also Gur et al., 2003).
The basic ﬁnding of Wolfe et al. (2005) has been widely repli-
cated (e.g., Fleck & Mitroff, 2007; Rich et al., 2008). Nevertheless,ll rights reserved.
).there have been active debates on the nature of this effect. Fleck
and Mitroff (2007), for example, argued that the source of the prev-
alence effect could be largely attributed to motor error. In their
study, when observers pressed the same key again and again for
target-absent trials in the low-prevalence blocks, they tended to
press the same key ‘‘prepotently” (i.e., too fast) even if, perceptu-
ally speaking, they could see the target. To demonstrate this, Fleck
and Mitroff (2007) showed that if the observers were given oppor-
tunities to correct their responses, their miss rates were dramati-
cally reduced (i.e., the observers could correct most of their
‘‘miss” trials). Later studies have followed this line of argument
(Rich et al., 2008; Van Wert, Horowitz, & Wolfe, 2009), and the
general ﬁnding was that, even if motor responses contribute signif-
icantly to the prevalence effect, there is still a robust perceptual ef-
fect if the task difﬁculty is high.
2.1. Top-down control and bottom-up priming in visual search
The present study asks one further question of the prevalence
effect: is the prevalence effect due to voluntary top-down control
for future prospect or bottom-up priming of past experience? In
the current study, what we term top-down control refers to an ef-
fect produced by knowledge about what will happen next. It is
sometimes referred to as the ‘‘expectation effect” and is often as-
sumed to be voluntary. On the other hand, the bottom-up priming
effect is produced by the sharing of some properties between the
currently presented stimuli and the preceding stimuli; it is some-
times called the ‘‘repetition effect” and is often assumed to be
automatic.
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itly distinguish between the effect of top-down control and the
bottom-up priming in a relevant ﬁeld (see also Huang & Pashler,
2005; Kristjánsson, Wang, & Nakayama, 2002). In their study, the
repetition and expectation effects of target color were examined.
They deﬁned top-down control as the observers’ expectation of
the target color being present in the upcoming trial and manipu-
lated bottom-up priming by repeating the target color of the previ-
ous trial(s). In their experiments, observers searched for one of the
possible color singleton targets (e.g., red or green) in a particular
trial; for example, if a target was red in trial N, then in trial
N + 1, a red target was ‘‘repeated” whereas a green target was
not. However, expectation also depends on the experimental set-
tings: in Maljkovic and Nakayama’s (1994) study, the color of tar-
gets varied randomly from trial to trial in some of the blocks, and
so the observers had no reliable expectations regarding the target
color of trial N + 1; in other blocks, the target color in the trials al-
most always alternated from one trial to the next, and so when the
target was red in trial N, the observers would expect the next trial
to be green, not red. Maljkovic and Nakayama (1994) found an
exclusive role of bottom-up repetition, but no role of top-down
expectation: response time was signiﬁcantly shorter if the target
color was repeated, compared to when it was not, and this differ-
ence was not affected by the expectation of the observers.
These two effects (i.e., repetition vs. expectation) are logically
orthogonal, but they could be easily confounded as they tend to
happen together in situations such as a long sequence of repeti-
tions. For example, Kristjánsson and colleagues (2002) asked
observers to perform conjunction searches for two types of poten-
tial targets (a search for a red-vertical or a green-horizontal target
among a distractor array of red-horizontal and green-vertical
items). The observers performed better when the type of targets re-
mained the same throughout thewhole block (i.e., a constant block)
rather than varying randomly (i.e., a random block). What is partic-
ularly interesting is that a few accidental repetitions within a ran-
dom block (i.e., experience) made the observers’ performance in
this block almost as good as that in a constant block, even if there
was no reason to predict that the repetition would continue (i.e.,
prospect). Clearly, experience, not prospect, determines the perfor-
mance, even if it had usually been attributed to expectation.
The experiments of Wolfe et al. (2005) could not distinguish be-
tween top-down control for future prospect and bottom-up prim-
ing of past experience. In each target-present trial in their
experiments, the targets were rare in the past and were expected
to be rare in the future. Therefore, the observers could have missed
the rare targets either because they knew that the targets were
going to be rare or because, from their past experience, the targets
had been rare.
How could we distinguish between these two possibilities? We
deliberately created situations in which past experience is different
from future prospect (e.g., the target has been frequent in the past,
but is known to be rare in the future). By exploiting such situations,
we can determine whether the prevalence effect is the result of
past experience or future prospect: if the prevalence effect occurs
whenever the future prospect of the target is ‘‘rare”, then, regard-
less of past experience, we know that the prevalence effect is the
result of future prospect; on the other hand, if the prevalence effect
occurs whenever, in the past experience, the target is ‘‘rare”, then,
regardless of future prospect, we know that the prevalence effect is
the result of past experience.3. Experiments 1 and 2
In Experiments 1 and 2, we tested the effect of past experience
and future prospect by giving the participants different instruc-tions in different blocks. However, regardless of the instructions gi-
ven, the frequency of the targets actually remained the same. If the
prevalence effect is determined by past experience and not future
prospect, then, regardless of the different instructions, we would
expect the magnitude of the prevalence effect to be identical. On
the other hand, if the prevalence effect is determined by future
prospect and not past experience, then we would expect higher
miss rates (i.e., stronger prevalence effects) when the instructions
suggest a lower target presence frequency.
One important methodological difference between the present
study and the one by Wolfe et al. (2005) is that we employed ‘‘ran-
dom mapping” for the response keys from trial to trial; for exam-
ple, the observers had to press ‘‘A” for target-presence and ‘‘L”
for target-absence in one trial, and then had to switch the mapping
rule for the next trial (i.e., ‘‘L”? target-presence; ‘‘A”? target-ab-
sence). This procedure was included to prevent the priming of mo-
tor responses, which was the confound discussed by Fleck and
Mitroff (2007). Thus, the measured prevalence effect was more of
a purely perceptual effect rather than an effect caused by making
prepotent responses.3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Observers
A total of 40 observers participated in the two experiments.
They were undergraduate students from the Chinese University
of Hong Kong, all of whom reported normal or corrected-to-normal
vision.3.1.2. Stimuli
Each stimulus display was generated from high resolution gray-
scale JPEG pictures (rescaled to 120  120 pixels). These pictures
comprised six different categories of items: toys, fruits, clothing,
birds, and tools. Each category contained six items. The picture
choices were identical to the study by Wolfe et al. (2005). The tar-
gets were the tool category items, while all of the other pictures
served as distractors.
Each trial contained 18 to-be-searched items. In the target-ab-
sent trials, 18 distractors were drawn from the 24-item distractor
pool without repetition; in the target-present trials, 17 items were
drawn from the distractor set and one item was drawn among the
six tool target items. All of the items were presented with a trans-
parency level of 20%. They could overlap with each other and were
presented in a random orientation within ±30 measured from the
center of individual pictures.
Surrounding the stimuli display was either a red or green frame,
which served as a cue for high and low target prevalence, respec-
tively. The observers were speciﬁcally told that: (1) when the
frame was red, targets would be likely to appear and (2) when
the frame was green, targets would be rare. They were not in-
formed about the actual target prevalence in each condition.
The letters ‘‘Y” and ‘‘N” appeared in the bottom-left and bottom-
right corners of the screen to indicate the observers’ choice of deci-
sions. When ‘‘Y” was on the left and ‘‘N” was on the right, the
observers pressed ‘‘A” for target-presence and ‘‘L” for target-ab-
sence. The key mapping could be reversed: when ‘‘Y” was on the
right and ‘‘N” was on the left, the observers pressed ‘‘A” for tar-
get-absence and ‘‘L” for target-presence. This response mapping
rule varied randomly from trial to trial.
The testing environment was programmed using JAVA pro-
gramming language. At a viewing distance of about 60 cm, each
item subtended a visual angle of 3.34  3.34. The stimuli display
measured 16.5  16.5, and the frame had a width of 0.43. Fig. 1a
and b shows examples of the target-present and target-absent
displays.
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Fig. 2. Results (miss rates) of Experiments 1 and 2. Target prevalence was
uniformly low across all of the test blocks in Experiment 1, but was high in
Experiment 2. In both experiments, participants were told that the targets would be
frequent in half of the blocks and rare in the remaining blocks. The above graph
shows that the miss error rate depended not on the instructions given but on the
overall true target prevalence of the blocks. The error bars denote the standard
errors of the miss errors across observers within the same condition.
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Fig. 1. Sample stimuli displays in Experiments 1, 2, and 4. (a) A target (a drill) was
present in the display. The frame on the computer monitor was red, indicating that
this was a ‘‘high-prevalence” trial. (b) No target was present in this sample display.
The frame on the computer monitor was green, indicating that this was a ‘‘low-
prevalence” trial. The response key mapping changed randomly from trial to trial,
and observers had to refer to the positions of the Y and N characters in each of the
trials to make an appropriate response.
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Each trial began with a ﬁxation cross, which was presented on
the screen for one second. Then, all of the items appeared simulta-
neously with the colored-frame cue and the response key instruc-
tions (i.e., ‘‘Y” & ‘‘N”). The display remained on the screen until the
observer responded by pressing either ‘‘A” or ‘‘L”.
First, theobservers completed20practice trials inorder tobecome
familiarwith the tasks. These trials were followed by eight blocks (80
trials each) that alternated between the high-prevalence and the low-
prevalence conditions. For Blocks 1–2, the frequencies were as in-
structed (i.e., green? 10%; red? 50%). For the next six blocks (i.e.,
Blocks 3–8), the prevalence level remained constant and was not af-
fected by the cues provided; in other words, the observers weremis-
informed in three of these six blocks. Regardless of the instructions
given: (1) in Experiment 1, Blocks 3–8 always had low target preva-
lence (i.e., 10%); and (2) in Experiment 2, Blocks 3–8 always had high
target prevalence (i.e., 50%). Observers were given feedback on their
performance on the practice trials, but not the test blocks.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Miss error rates
All error rates data were arcsine transformed in order to stabi-
lize the variances. In both experiments, Blocks 1 and 2 wereconducted with valid instructions. These blocks served as an exam-
ination of whether our method would produce a typical low prev-
alence effect. They were analyzed together across Experiments 1
and 2 because the two experiments were identical in these blocks.
There is clear evidence that our method produced a typical low
prevalence effect (High prevalence: M = 12%; SD = 7%; Low preva-
lence: M = 22%; SD = 19.3%); t(39) = 3.75; p < 0.002.
Only the data from Blocks 3–8 were further analyzed. Fig. 2 pre-
sents the miss rates. The miss rates were signiﬁcantly lower in
Experiment 2 (with all high-prevalence blocks) than in Experiment
1, F(1, 38) = 24.69; p < 0.001. When the instructions suggested a
lower frequency, these rates were slightly higher in Experiment 2
but slightly lower in Experiment 1. Importantly, neither the main
effect of instruction, F(1, 38) = 0.54; p = 0.46 nor the interaction be-
tween experiment and instruction were signiﬁcant, F(1, 38) = 0.67;
p = 0.42. Thus, the miss rates within the same experiments were
roughly identical regardless of the instructions given, but were
sensitive to the true target prevalence.
3.2.2. Reaction times
Only correct response trials were analyzed, and outliers (i.e., be-
yond three standard deviations for each individual observer) were
excluded from the analysis. For target-present trials, there were no
statistically reliable differences between high- and low-prevalence
cue trials in either Experiment 1 (Red cue: 1902 ms; Green cue:
1921 ms, t(19) = 0.198) or Experiment 2 (Red cue: 1570 ms;
Green cue: 1548 ms, t(19) = 0.715). In target-absent trials, when
the instructions suggested a higher target prevalence, the observ-
ers were signiﬁcantly slower to respond in both Experiments 1
(Red cue: 3125 ms; Green cue: 2603 ms, t(19) = 3.76; p < 0.002)
and 2 (Red cue: 3625 ms; Green cue: 3309 ms, t(19) = 2.21;
p < 0.05). The data clearly suggests that when the observers were
instructed to expect a higher target prevalence, they searched for
a longer time before deciding that a display contained no target.
In other words, the observers were actively following the
instructions.
3.3. Discussion
To sum up, in both Experiments 1 and 2, the miss error rates re-
veal no difference in terms of the instruction (i.e., different future
prospects). On the other hand, there was a very large difference
in the error rate data between Experiments 1 and 2 that supported
the past experience account. In short, the prevalence effect was
Red
a
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prospect.
One may potentially question this conclusion by suggesting that
the absence of an ‘‘instruction effect” was caused by the invalidity
of the instructions and that a valid instruction would signiﬁcantly
affect the prevalence effect. In other words, the observers quickly
realized that our instructions were misleading and therefore they
voluntarily stopped relying on them. This seems unlikely because
when observers were instructed to expect a higher target preva-
lence, they took longer to decide that a display contained no target;
therefore, they were actively following the instructions. Experi-
ments 3 and 4 tested the question using a more rigorous approach.Green
b
Fig. 3. Sample stimuli displays in Experiment 3. (a) No target was present in this
sample display. The frame on the computer monitor was red, indicating that this
was a ‘‘high-prevalence” trial. (b) A target (a wrench) was present in the display.
The frame on the computer monitor was green, indicating that this was a ‘‘low-
prevalence” trial.4. Experiments 3 and 4
In Experiments 3 and 4, we tested the effect of past experience
and future prospect by giving the observers different instructions
in different trials. There were two main differences between these
experiments and Experiments 1 and 2. First, the instructions were
always valid: if the instruction indicated that the prevalence of tar-
get would be 10%, then it was indeed 10%. Second, the instructions
could now vary between the trial levels. Some blocks (constant
blocks) contained trials of the same target prevalence throughout
the whole block, whereas other blocks (mixed blocks) contained
a mixture of trials with two prevalence levels.
To be more precise, in Experiments 3 and 4: (1) in a ‘‘constant
high-prevalence” block, the target prevalence in the past was 50%
and the target was always expected to be present 50% of the time;
(2) in a ‘‘constant low-prevalence” block, the target prevalence in
the past was 10% and the target was always expected to be present
10% of the time; and (3) in a ‘‘mixed” block, the target prevalence
in the past was 30% (i.e., the average of high and low prevalence),
but the expectation of target prevalence for individual trial was
either 50% or 10%, depending on the cue presented in the frame.
Naturally, it was expected that the observers would miss fewer tar-
gets in a ‘‘constant high-prevalence” block than in a ‘‘constant low-
prevalence” block. However, we believed that the ‘‘mixed” block
could reveal more interesting information: if the prevalence effect
depends on future prospect, then we would expect a comparable
difference between trials in which high prevalence is predicted
and those in which low prevalence is predicted. On the other hand,
if the prevalence effect depends on past experience, then we would
expect no such difference.
The only difference between Experiments 3 and 4 was the levels
of task difﬁculty (see below). We varied the levels of difﬁculty to
see whether the observers behaved in a similar fashion.4.1. Methods
4.1.1. Observers
There were, respectively, 35 and 31 observers in Experiments 3
and 4. The data of one observer from Experiment 4 were aban-
doned altogether because the observer was obviously not follow-
ing the instructions (i.e., overall performance close to the chance
level).4.1.2. Stimuli
The stimuli used were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2.
However, in Experiment 3, the stimuli items did not overlap with
each other and they were always presented in a ﬁxed orientation
(i.e., 0) (see Fig. 3 for a sample display). These changes were made
to reduce the task difﬁculty in order to test whether the same re-
sults would be obtained when the task difﬁculty varied.4.1.3. Procedure
In Experiments 3 and 4, the procedure was the same as in
Experiments 1and 2 except that there were two types of blocks:
(1) constant blocks, in which the cue (i.e., the color of the frame)
remained the same for the whole block; and (2) mixed blocks, in
which the cue (i.e., color of the frame) varied randomly from trial
to trial. The meanings of the cues were the same as in Experiments
1 and 2, and, unlike in Experiments 1 and 2, the cues were always
valid. The constant blocks were further divided into ‘‘constant
high-prevalence” blocks and ‘‘constant low-prevalence” blocks.
The blocks alternated between these different types. The order of
the blocks was counterbalanced across the observers.4.2. Results
4.2.1. Error rates
We submitted the miss error rates to a mixed ANOVA design for
statistical analysis. Experiments 3 and 4 only differed in terms of
level of difﬁculty, and this factor yielded a signiﬁcant main effect,
F(1, 63) = 27.58; p < 0.001. Comparing the two experiments, the
observers made more miss errors when the level of difﬁculty in-
creased. Given that the to-be-searched items could be overlapping
each other in Experiment 4 but not in Experiment 3, this is not par-
ticular surprising.
As the level of difﬁculty factor did not interact with the other
variables (all ps > 0.08), we collapsed this factor over the other
variables in subsequent analysis. In Experiments 3 and 4, the miss
rate in the constant high-prevalence blocks was signiﬁcantly lower
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p < 0.001. However, within the mixed blocks, the miss rate in the
high-prevalence trials was roughly identical to that in the low-
prevalence trials, t(64) = 1.56; p = 0.13. The interaction between
block condition (i.e., constant vs. mixed) and prevalence (i.e., high
vs. low) was signiﬁcant, F(1, 63) = 11.42; p = 0.002. Fig. 4 shows the
miss rates of the four conditions in Experiments 3 and 4. The usual
prevalence effect disappeared when the past experience were
identical, even if the future prospect was very different. In sum,
the results of Experiments 3 and 4 conﬁrmed that the prevalence
effect depends on past experience, not future prospect.4.2.2. Reaction times
Only correct response trials were analyzed, and outliers (i.e., be-
yond three standard deviations for each individual observer) were
excluded from the analysis. For target-present trials, there were no
statistically reliable differences between high- and low-prevalence
cue trials in either Experiment 3 (Mixed: Red cue, 1137 ms vs. Green
cue, 1149 ms, t(34) = 0.631; Constant: Red cue, 1116 ms vs. Green
cue, 1188 ms, t(34) = 1.937) or Experiment 4 (Mixed: Red cue,
1661 ms vs. Green cue, 1723 ms, t(29) = 1.170; Constant: Red
cue, 1620 ms vs. Green cue, 1681 ms, t(29) = 0.734). For target-ab-
sent trials, when a higher target prevalence was suggested in the
instructions, observers were signiﬁcantly (or nearly signiﬁcantly)
slower to respond in both Experiments 3 (Mixed: Red cue,
1693 ms vs. Green cue, 1647 ms, t(34) = 3.59; p < 0.002; Constant:
Red cue, 1772 ms vs. Green cue, 1625 ms, t(34) = 1.86; p < 0.1) and
4 (Mixed: Red cue, 3486 ms vs. Green cue, 3185 ms, t(29) = 6.06;
p < 0.001; Constant: Red cue, 3377 ms vs. Green cue, 2827 ms,0%
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Fig. 4. Results (miss rates) of Experiments 3 (a) and 4 (b). In both Experiments 3
and 4, in constant blocks, the miss rates in the ‘‘high-prevalence” condition were
signiﬁcantly lower than those in the ‘‘low-prevalence” condition, whereas in mixed
blocks, the miss rates in the ‘‘high-prevalence” and ‘‘low-prevalence” conditions
were about the same. See text for details.t(29) = 3.71; p < 0.002). The data clearly suggests that when the
observers were instructed to expect a higher target prevalence, they
took longer to decide that a display contained no target. In other
words, the observers were actively following the instructions.
5. General discussion
In our four experiments, we showed that the prevalence effect,
as reported by Wolfe et al. (2005), depends on past experience, not
future prospect. This furthered our understanding of this phenom-
enon and could potentially help to reveal its nature.
One important debate regarding the nature of the prevalence ef-
fect is whether it genuinely affects perception (Wolfe et al., 2005)
or simply reﬂects a tendency to respond too early (Fleck & Mitroff,
2007). In all of our experiments, we randomized the response keys,
thus making sure that the observers did not press any one of the
response keys more often than the others. Nonetheless, the observ-
ers still made more miss errors when the target prevalence was
low. This ﬁnding is in agreement with the report by Van Wert
et al. (2009) which stated that allowing observers to correct their
decisions does not extinguish the low prevalence effect.
The present study also sheds light on the broader question as to
whether the prevalence effect is a stubborn tendency of the visual
search mechanism (Navalpakkam et al., 2009; Wolfe et al., 2007)
or whether it can be easily inﬂuenced or ‘‘cured” by various types
of manipulation (Fleck & Mitroff, 2007). In the report by Navalpak-
kam and colleagues, for instance, the prevalence effect was only
eliminated in extreme conditions inwhich therewas a hugediscrep-
ancy between gain and penalty for correct and incorrect responses
and the observers were competing against each other for a prize.
Wolfe and colleagues (2007) also reported that, except for the tech-
nique of inserting sudden bursts of high-prevalence trials into a
block, the various means of reducing miss rates in low-prevalence
blocks seem to be futile. Our results support the view that the prev-
alence effect is very robust by showing that it is exclusively the con-
sequence of bottom-up experience and is not affected by top-down
control. What makes this result particularly interesting is that the
observers took longer to respond ‘‘No” when they were given cues
suggesting a higher probability of target presence. In other words,
they did indeed actively follow the instructions. Nevertheless, their ef-
forts did not help to ‘‘cure” the prevalence effect. This gives strong
support to the view that the prevalence effect is very stubborn and,
even with reasonable motivation and effort, cannot be overriden.
The present study also has important practical implications. We
want to reduce the error rates in real-life low-prevalence situa-
tions, such as airport baggage screening or X-ray examination in
medical settings. Naturally, one may hope to do so by giving the
workers stricter instructions. The present study suggests that such
a method is probably futile. The only effective method is to ran-
domly distribute some ‘‘pseudo-targets” into the screening, there-
by ensuring that, by gaining experience with such targets, workers
will not miss real targets when they show up.
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